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clusters, reducing it below the
threshold for percolation.
Although some of the ideas in this
paper have clear parallels with those in
Turner’s and Pitcher’s [6] ‘attack
abatement’ model, the notion of
a critical percolation threshold
triggering gregarious behaviour is
entirely novel. The Reynolds et al. [2]
paper is important for a number of
other reasons. For one thing, this is the
first time that percolation theory has
been used to understand the benefits
of group-living as an anti-predator
defence. Indeed, although percolation
theory is commonly used in physics,
materials science, engineering and
chemistry, less than 3% of the 1000+
papers published in this area over the
last five years have addressed
ecological or environmental issues
(ISI Web of Knowledge).
Secondly, the paper illustrates how
percolation theory might be applied
more generally to understand the
evolution of group-living [7]. Previous
studies have argued that living in
groups may have evolved as
a defence against parasites and
pathogens, because by aggregating
together the connectivity between
groups of potential hosts is reduced
and there is an increased probability
that disease epidemics sweeping
through a population will fade out,
because of a shortage of nearby
susceptible hosts [8]. Whilst spatially-
explicit agent-based models seem to
confirm the benefits of group-living as
an anti-parasite defence, percolation
theory has not yet been applied in this
context (but see [9]). However, it seems
likely that percolation theory may
provide a general theoretical
framework for understanding the
evolution of gregarious behaviour as
a defence against any natural enemy
that exploits clusters of hosts.
Thirdly, this study is important
because it suggests that aggregative
behaviour may have been the first step
in the evolution of the suite of traits we
commonly refer to as phase
polyphenism. This is because it argues
that there are benefits to individuals of
congregating in groups even in the
absence of any benefits associated
with unpalatability, aposematic
coloration or kin-selection. Once
gregarious behaviour has evolved,
selection would then favour other
traits to maximise the benefits of
group living and to minimise its
costs, including the evolution of
aposematism [10], cannibalism [11],
and density-dependent prophylaxis
[12]. Whilst a spatially-explicit
evolutionary model has yet to be
developed to explore these ideas fully,
it seems likely that the use of
percolation theory to study the
evolution of aggregative behaviour will
prove to be a highly significant
advance. Hopefully, percolation theory
will permeate further into mainstream
evolutionary ecology than it has done
since its origins more than a quarter of
a century ago.
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R23Perceptual Learning: Inverting the
Size–Weight Illusion
When one lifts two objects of equal weight and appearance but different size,
the smaller object usually feels heavier. New results show that this size–weight
illusion can be inverted after extensive training with objects in which the natural
size–weight relationship is artificially reversed.
Marc O. Ernst
The size–weight illusion, whereby
a smaller object feels heavier than
a larger one of equal weight, was first
described over 100 years ago by
Charpentier ([1]; see [2]). In the natural
environment, an object’s weight is
positively correlated with its size. Thus
when one lifts the larger of two objects,
it is expected to be heavier. According
to most hypotheses, the size–weight
illusion occurs when this expectation
is not met. In particular, it has been
argued that the illusion might be
caused by a mismatch between the
sensorimotor prediction and the actual
weight. According to this mismatch
hypothesis, the wrong prediction
would lead to motor commandsscaled inappropriately for the object’s
weight. A few years ago, Flanagan
et al. [3] disproved this hypothesis
by showing that, after repeated
lifting of the same objects, the
sensorimotor prediction adjusts
such that the load-force when
grasping the objects is scaled
correctly, while the size–weight
illusion persisted. If not a
sensorimotor mismatch, perhaps
a perceptual mismatch causes the
illusion, or is the illusion even
independent of prior expectations?
In a recent paper in Current Biology,
Flanagan et al. [4] report that the
size–weight illusion can be inverted
after extensive training with objects
in which the size–weight relationship
is artificially reversed. They also show
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inverted relationship, and interestingly
they do so much more quickly than
the size–weight illusion. Because the
illusion can persist whether or not
the motor commands for lifting the
objects are scaled correctly and
because the illusion is adaptable,
the authors conclude that the size–
weight illusion is a purely perceptual
illusion, caused by an unmatched
prior expectation that comes from
the statistics of the environment.
Why does the illusion adapt at
a different rate from other weight
judgements? Flanagan et al. [4] argue
that the tasks of picking up an object
and comparing weights, as during the
illusion, involve different forms of
knowledge: picking up the object
involves knowledge about the weight of
each individual object, whereas the
knowledge involved in the size–weight
illusion concerns the size–weight
relationship of the entire family of
objects. Given this argument, there
should be no or little generalization of
learning for the load-force parameter,
because this is based on the identity
of the individual objects (a steep
generalization gradient), whereas there
should be extensive generalization of
learning with the size-weight illusion: it
should generalize to the entire family
of objects (shallow generalization
gradient). Flanagan et al. [4] found
some generalization in both cases.
Unfortunately, however, they tested
generalization of learning only for
one new object, so it is unclear whether
the generalization gradients actually
differ.
At first glance, the finding of different
adaptation rates for load-force and
the size–weight illusion might seem like
an example of a perception–action
dissociation (for example [5–7]).
According to this dissociation
hypothesis, there are two visual
systems: one for perception and one
for guiding actions [8]. Load-force is
indeed an action parameter and the
size–weight illusion is seemingly
perceptual [3,4]. But load-force, being
based on knowledge about the
individual object, and the illusion, being
based on knowledge about the
size–weight relationship of the entire
family of objects, are also different in
many other respects. Thus, it may
be inappropriate to generalize from
just these two parameters to a
dissociation of perception and action
on the whole.Such a generalization, however, has
already been suggested [7]. But this is
even more questionable, as one could
easily find other perceptual tasks
involving weight estimates that adapt
at different rates from the size–weight
illusion. For example, in the work of
Flanagan et al. [4], the participants very
quickly became consciously aware of
the fact that the small objects were very
heavy and the large objects were very
light. That is, after just a few lifts,
participants could tell that the small
objects were really heavy and the large
objects were really light (Randy
Flanagan, personal communication).
Thus, if one were to measure the
expected weight for the individual
objects by simply asking the
participants prior to lifting the object
how heavy they think it will be, one
can see that such a judgement
adapts much more quickly than the
size–weight illusion. Such a judgement
is without doubt cognitive/perceptual
and does not involve a motor response,
which is why any general conclusion
from just the load-force and the
size–weight illusion about action
versus perception is an
overgeneralization.
An interesting remaining question
is, why knowledge about the weights
of the individual objects should be
acquired at a different rate than
knowledge about the size–weight
relationship of the entire family of
objects? After all there are the same
number of objects involved in both
learning tasks. In a recent study, Burge
et al. [9] showed experimentally that the
learning rate on the one hand depends
on the quality of sensory information.
On the other hand, the rate also
depends on whether changes are to
be expected or not (see also [10]). As
Flanagan et al. [4] point out, individual
objects are more likely to change in
weight. Imagine, for example, a water
bottle being more or less full, or a piece
of wood that might be really light or
quite heavy. Thus, adjustments in the
load-force during handling of objects
are very likely to occur in many
everyday situations. Compared to this,
it is very unlikely that within an object
class the size–weight relationship is
altered significantly. As Burge et al. [9]
showed, one can describe the effect
of the likelihood of change (process
noise) on the adaptation rate
quantitatively using a Kalman-Filter
approach, which can be derived using
the Bayesian framework.It has been shown that many
perceptual illusions can be described
using the Bayesian framework [11]. By
adapting the size–weight illusion after
artificially altering the size–weight
relationship demonstrates
unequivocally that indeed the cause of
the size–weight illusion is a comparison
of the sensed weight with the
expected weight given the size of the
object. Thus prior knowledge is
used that comes from the statistics
of the environment. Using such
prior knowledge representing
the environmental statistics is
a characteristic of the Bayesian
approach (for example [12–16]). In
the Bayesian approach, however,
prior knowledge is integrated with
the sensory evidence, which would
produce an intermediate result
weighting prior expectancy and
sensory evidence according to their
relative reliabilities [17]. In contrast, the
size–weight illusion is a contrast effect
and not average: smaller objects seem
to be heavier. Thus the size–weight
illusion is still a puzzling effect and
it can even be argued that it is an
anti-Bayesian effect.
In conclusion, despite over 100 years
of research in which the size–weight
illusion has been well described and
characterized, we still lack a good
explanation of why the illusion
occurs — saying it occurs because
the expectation is not matched and
thus we perceive a contrast is only
a description of the effect, and
not an explanation.
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of Symmetry
Most proteins form symmetric, multimer
a strong prevalence for symmetry among
bias even in the absence of other adapti
Kevin W. Plaxco and Michael Gross
Proteins like to stick together,
especially with their own kind.
While tallies vary it appears that for at
least two-thirds of all proteins the
preferred form is that of a complex
(an oligomer) of several protein
molecules (monomers) [1]. And
while many of these oligomers are
heterogenous — composed of
more than one type of polypeptide
chain — the majority are
homogeneous, or are mixtures of
the two (for example, hemoglobin is
a tetramer made up of two identical
copies of a heterodimer). Considering
that protein molecules are asymmetric
by default — as all but one of their
building blocks are chiral — and their
overall shapes are also highly irregular,
it is surprising that the very large
majority of these homogeneous
oligomers form rotationally symmetric
structures, ranging from simple
head-to-head (as opposed to
asymmetric head-to-tail) dimers to
the beautiful 64-subunit icosahedral
structures of many viral capsids. A
recent paper by Baker and co-workers
[2] sheds new light on the origins of
the remarkable ubiquity of such
symmetry.
Symmetry arises when two subunits
interact via a symmetric interface in
which amino acids x and y on one
subunit interact with, respectively,
their pendants y0 and x0 on the second
subunit. But because protein surfaces
are typically large and convex the13. Ernst, M.O. (2007). Learning to integrate
arbitrary signals from vision and touch.
J. Vision 7, 1–14.
14. Ernst, M.O., Banks, M.S., and Bu¨lthoff, H.H.
(2000). Touch can change visual slant
perception. Nat. Neurosci. 3, 69–73.
15. Atkins, J.E., Fiser, J., and Jacobs, R.A. (2001).
Experience-dependent visual cue
integration based on consistencies
between visual and haptic percepts.
Vision Res. 41, 449–461.
16. Knill, D.C. (2007). Learning Bayesian priors for
depth perception. J. Vision 7, 1–20.The Evolution
ic complexes. Modeling shows that
stable structures can account for this
ve advantages.
simultaneous formation of such
symmetry-related interactions is
often hindered by geometry, and only
a tiny fraction of all possible sets of
homodimers will be symmetric. Given
the discrepancy between the rarity
of symmetric interactions among
the set of all possible dimers, and
the frequency with which symmetry
occurs within the set of observed
dimers, it has long been assumed
that symmetry itself must provide
a selective advantage. For example,
it has been argued that rotationally
symmetric structures are common
because their formation saturates
all of the available binding sites
(which, for example, head-to-tail
dimers fail to do), leading to closed
structures of well-defined
stoichiometry [3].
Baker and co-workers [2] advance
an alternative theory: that symmetric
structures are common because
symmetric interfaces are over-
represented among the set of all
energetically favorable interactions.
In other words, symmetric structures
are common, not because they provide
a selective advantage per se, but
because stable, symmetric dimers
are much more common than stable,
asymmetric dimers in the underlying
‘chemical space’ of energetically
favorable dimeric structures, and
thus the former represent a larger,
more accessible evolutionary target.
One of the oldest notions in
probability theory, and the basis
for statistical mechanics, is the17. Ernst, M.O., and Bu¨lthoff, H.H. (2004). Merging
the senses into a robust percept. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 8, 162–169.
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DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2008.10.039observation that the more often one
gambles the closer the average
outcome of one’s bets hews to the
theoretical mean. Conversely, in the
gambler’s paradox, a punter who
bets half as often but twice as much
would double the variance of his
expected outcome and thus flirts
with ruin. The same principle also
applies to the pair-wise energetics
and evolution of proteins. For
example, Monod, Wyman, and
Changeux [3] noted that each
interaction formed in the interface
of a symmetric dimer occurs twice.
Hence the impact of a favorable (or
unfavorable) mutation is doubled
for symmetric interfaces, increasing
the rate with which evolution can
optimize a symmetric structure once
it is initially found. Baker and
co-workers [2], however, have
modeled Monod’s conjecture using
explicit protein-docking simulations
and found that, while the effect is
present, a counter effect works
against it: because it contains only
half as many unique amino acids,
the mutation rate for a symmetric
interface slows by a factor of two,
limiting the impact of this mechanism.
Instead they find that the gambler’s
paradox favors symmetric dimers
by increasing the ease with which
they are discovered in the first
place.
Lukatsky et al. [4] recently studied
identical interactions randomly
scattered on two planar disks and
found that the lowest energies of
co-axially docked disks occur when
the patterns on the opposing disks
are the same rather than different
(homodimers rather than
heterodimers). They did not determine,
however, how the density of states
varies as the interactions deviate from
symmetry, and thus the importance of
their effect in the evolution of symmetry
